

Approved For Release 2004/04/01 : CIA-RDP80R01731R00040047001

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

The entire speech is critical of present and past US foreign policy with particular respect to the economic aid programs. I do not believe that you would wish to do more than acknowledge receipt.

HDS

12 June 1956  
(DATE)

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8 2908/A

*card*  
Honorable Chester Bowles  
Essex, Connecticut

Dear Chester:

Many thanks for the reprint of your speech for the annual Newton D. Baker lecture. I have read your presentation with considerable interest and have passed it along to some of my senior advisors.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely,

NOT SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

ORIGINAL COPY 23 54 79  
DEC 20 11  
EXT BY [unclear] Same  
REASON 3d(3)

O/DD/I

[redacted] p (12 Jun 56)

Distribution:

ER - 2

O/DD/I-2 ✓

ER: This letter was not answered. Apparently the original and concurrence were destroyed - and the carbons of ER 8-3228/a destroyed (a different letter, in error). Note on ER 8-3228/a that I had had to prepare all new carbons - so the supposition is that ER 8-2908/a should have been destroyed instead.

Put this in file as a reference as to what must have happened. Mark log, not answered.

*Jerry*  
Jerry 7/10

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AT

The letter from Mr. Bowles was never acknowledged so far as I can determine. A reply was sent in for Mr. Dulles' signature, but that letter, with the concurrence copy has not turned up again.

Perhaps you have decided not to acknowledge in view of last sentence of incoming letter. (which is dated 18 May)

Do you wish me to retype an original for signature? \_\_\_\_\_

No answer required \_\_\_\_\_

*I am positive this  
was signed. Ash*

Jerry 7/10

AT

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*See STAT  
STAT  
8/29/81  
not in file*

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
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DULLES

After you have noted I will send this to  
DD/I for information.



23 May 56  
(DATE)

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CHESTER BOWLES  
ESSEX, CONNECTICUT

May 18, 1956

Dear Allen:

I am enclosing a reprint of a speech which I recently prepared for the Annual Newton D. Baker Lecture in the Cleveland Auditorium under the auspices of the Cleveland Council on World Affairs.

Although I cut it substantially for actual delivery, I thought you might be interested in seeing the full presentation of an approach which I am increasingly convinced a majority of the American people are prepared to accept. Please don't bother to acknowledge this.


With my best wishes.

Sincerely,

  
Chester Bowles

Mr. Allen Dulles  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

CB.sh  
encl.



# Behind American Foreign Policy

. . . the Need to Redefine Our  
National Purpose

*By* CHESTER BOWLES

Expanded Text of the Annual Newton D. Baker Memorial  
Address in the Cleveland Auditorium Under the Auspices of  
The Cleveland Council of World Affairs, April 18, 1956

## BEHIND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

### *. . . The Need to Redefine Our National Purpose*

By CHESTER BOWLES

In these last few months our relations with the world have entered a new and fateful phase. The refinement of nuclear weapons has brought us to a kind of military stalemate which the Soviet Union with brilliant skill has used to seize the political, economic and ideological initiative. Meanwhile the United States has remained mired in old politics, old tactics, and more dangerous still, old habits of thinking.

I do not suggest that we have been apathetic or idle. On the contrary, we have been busily at work organizing alliances, forging security systems, issuing pronouncements, arguing over foreign aid, bustling from conference to conference, and debating the state of our military defense. Yet in spite of our far-flung global activities, we seem to be losing ground.

Sometimes it almost seems as though we, too, have gone through the Looking-Glass and arrived in Alice's Wonderland World. Do you remember Alice's encounter with the fast-moving Red Queen?

"... The Queen went so fast that it was all Alice could do to keep up with her, and still the Queen kept crying, 'Faster!' The most curious part of the thing was, that the trees and the other things around them never changed their places at all; however fast they went, they never seemed to pass anything.

"Suddenly, just as Alice was getting quite exhausted, they stopped, and she found herself sitting on the ground, breathless and giddy.

"Alice looked round her in great surprise. 'Why, I do believe we've been under this tree all the time! Everything's just as it was!'

"'Of course it is,' said the Queen. 'What would you have it?'

"'Well, in *our* country,' said Alice, still panting a little, 'you'd generally get somewhere else — if you ran very fast for a long time, as we've been doing.'

"'A slow sort of country!' said the Queen, 'Now *here*, you see, it takes all the running *you* can do, to keep in the same place.'

Alice's dilemma has a familiar ring. As we look around us we see the same old problems — and they seem to grow steadily more difficult and exhausting.

Since the Korean War ended in 1953 we have spent \$146 billion to assure our national security. One hundred and forty billion dollars has gone directly or indirectly for military defense. The rest has been spent on foreign information services, economic aid, intelligence, diplomatic missions and other overseas activities. Altogether our national security bill for this three year period equals one-third of the gross national in-

come of the Soviet Union, and averages \$3000 for every family in the United States.

Yet in spite of this stupendous expenditure, our situation throughout the world appears considerably weaker than it was three years ago. Military leaders bluntly tell us that our defense position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union has deteriorated. Neutralism is spreading. The vast oil reserves of the Middle East are threatened. From Iceland to Cyprus our NATO defenses are being undermined. The Balkan alliance may be split. West Germany and Japan are under increasing pressure. Our influence and prestige in Asia, Africa and Europe has diminished ominously while that of the Soviet Union has increased.

In other words, our huge industrial capacity, our armaments, our grants, our loans, our conferences, our Nato, Seato, and Northern Tier alliances have not even enabled us to stay where we are. And Mr. Khrushchev as the Red Queen seems to be laughing and saying, "If you want to get anywhere in *this* world you must run at least twice as fast as that."

Is Mr. Khrushchev correct? I remain unconvinced. Our policies have lacked for neither energy nor funds. What they have lacked, I believe, is something vastly more important — a sense of policy direction that takes into account the full dimensions of the global challenge and the difficulties we face in coming to grips with it.

The military phase of the Soviet challenge has been not only ominous but obvious; here our reaction has been vigorous if not always sensitive to other considerations. The economic and political challenge has been less familiar, here our response has appeared clumsy, diffused and timid.

But the *ideological dimensions* of the challenge — the depth of our commitment to the libertarian faith, the capacity of our democratic government to move boldly and flexibly in the face of new problems, the adequacy of our educational system, our ability to communicate with each other and with others overseas, even the capacity of our nation and our civilization to survive — this complex, far-flung, perhaps even mortal, challenge we seem scarcely to have recognized at all.

I do not suggest that most American leaders are not concerned and deeply so, with the grim deterioration of our power and influence abroad. Indeed, there is agreement among many Republicans as well as Democrats that we sorely need a reappraisal of our foreign policy, and an agonizing one at that.

Yet the question is most often posed in a way which assumes that a foreign policy is something that may be changed like a suit of clothes — a matter of new logistics, a new foreign aid program, a re-study of our alliances, new leadership in the Department of State. Although some of these moves would certainly help, I submit that this is too narrow a view.



### WHAT IS OUR NATIONAL PURPOSE?

American foreign policy is not an end in itself. It is the *means* by which we pursue our national objectives beyond our frontiers. What precisely then are those national objectives and what can we do to achieve them? What does America want from the world? What is she prepared to contribute?

These questions are crucially important. On our considered answers to them and the policies that flow out of those answers, may depend our position as a great power, the future of Western liberal democratic society, and the course of world history.

If we were to put these questions to a Gallup poll sample of our fellow citizens, a majority might say something like this: "We Americans have a great country. We want only the right and opportunity to enjoy its blessings in peace. The Russians threaten that right. In foreign affairs our national purpose must be to put them in their place, so that we can live our own lives without interference."

Although this answer may sound reasonable, it should not be accepted uncritically. Let us examine its implications in today's interrelated and stormy world, and see where it leads us.

If our national purpose is really limited to a determination to "enjoy the blessings of our great country" without further regard for the interests of others, precisely what does the bulk of mankind have in common with the United States? Once their old fears of Soviet aggression relax, and in most of the world these fears are now fast diminishing, why should other nations support *our* aims, join *our* alliances or follow *our* voting lead in the United Nations?

There are some who will promptly raise the counter question: "America is rich and powerful. Our natural wealth is great. Why should we concern ourselves with others?" This viewpoint, sometimes articulated and sometimes not, is deeply held by many of those who oppose a more positive foreign policy. It can be answered persuasively, I believe, on the same narrow grounds on which it is asked.

Although we Americans produce nearly 50% of the world's manufactured goods, we are only 6% of the world's people. Another 15% is associated with us through alliances of varying reliability. The Moscow-Peking bloc makes up 35%. The remainder of the world, living largely in Asia, Africa, and South America, and constituting nearly 50% of mankind, is committed to varying degrees of neutralism.

Although these billion or more people are largely impoverished and illiterate, there has been a momentous change in their *attitudes*. Today they are wide awake to the promise of a better life which is inherent in our modern technology. They are earnestly and aggressively seeking freedom from the last vestiges of colonialism. They are seeking the respect of their fellow men, and rapid economic advancement.

The new Soviet tactics appear to have one clear objective: to win the confidence of these billion or more Asians, Africans, and South Americans who will almost certainly hold the balance of power in tomorrow's world, if not in today's, to draw them into an ever closer economic and

political relationship, and eventually to cut us off from the world's resources and people on whom our future security and prosperity depend.

This latter possibility cannot lightly be brushed aside. Already our expanding industrial machine imports 50% of its industrial raw materials. In Britain the figure is closer to 85%. These requirements will grow rapidly in the coming years. The bulk of these essential raw materials must continue to come from Africa, South America, the Middle East and Asia. Eighty per cent of all the oil in the non-Communist world is concentrated within 300 miles of the Persian Gulf.

In the last few years the Soviet Union has developed to a point where it has much to offer these crucially important, underdeveloped continents. Russia's gross national product, although still much less than ours, is expanding at double our rate. Russian universities are graduating each year considerably more qualified engineers and scientists than America and Western Europe combined. Russia already offers favorable markets for Burmese rice, Ceylonese rubber, Egyptian cotton. Russia's totalitarian government can mold its economics to fit its political objectives.

If Asia, Africa and South America, with Germany and Japan, should find their way into a closed political-economic relationship with Moscow and Peking, the result for American and the Atlantic nations would be catastrophic. Our standards of living would sag. Our ability to defend ourselves would be gravely diminished. Our liberties would be increasingly sacrificed to the harsh demands of a garrison state.

I have deliberately put this proposition on its lowest level of unadulterated, material self-interest. How can American power, prosperity and security be maintained if the majority of peoples in Asia, Africa and South America who share neither our riches or perspective, ultimately turns against us? How can we avoid economic and political isolation and ultimate strangulation? Who could we count on as allies in a nuclear war?

The peoples of these surging continents might put their questions even more bluntly. "Why should we die and sacrifice to keep tourist business booming at Miami Beach, to assure a continuing bull market in Wall Street, and to preserve the right of Americans to the world's highest per capita income?"

### ***THE AGE OF WILSON***

I believe that an insight into our present dilemma may be achieved by a consideration of the Age of Wilson. Here we may find not only a key to our problem of national security, but to our frustrations as well.

When World War I was over, Americans suddenly realized that people all over the world were looking to them for leadership. They saw that Woodrow Wilson embodied many of the hopes and dreams of mankind. They saw tens of thousands of French peasants kneel in homage as his train sped through the countryside. They saw whole governments, as in Italy, shake as our President went over their heads to appeal

to the people. They saw the millions in Asia and Africa straighten up with the new conviction that soon they would no longer be the world's forgotten men.

Here was world power and influence in its most profound sense. How had it come into being? The key lies in what Wilson stood for.

"The world must be made safe for democracy," Wilson had said. That was America's purpose, and because it was also the purpose of most of mankind, for that one happy interval we no longer felt frustration; we were in tune with our fellow men everywhere.

The American people agreed that it would be "a war to end wars." And in the peace that was to come, they would work with others to "make the world itself at last free." They would be "the champions of the rights of mankind" — including "the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments."

"America was created to unite mankind," Wilson said. And with this purpose in mind, his "urgent advice" was for Americans not only to think of America, but in order to be truly American, "always, also, to think first of humanity."

As a boy, these words of Wilson stirred me more than any I had ever heard. They led me to break with my Republican family's politics. They are the words that led me into public life.

Wilson's great objective seemed to me to make sense, to give a moral base to our national and international actions. This, I thought, was the logical application of the first principles on which our country was founded; this was the extension of the world of those truths which once we held self-evident.

It may properly be said that America was younger then in her knowledge of world affairs — naive and youthful and idealistic. That may be so, but in our first entry into the world after our century of developing the West, we managed to capture and to lift the spirit of the world. We came, young and dedicated, the new world to the rescue and liberation of the old, and the old world responded, and gave us its heart.

We were naive, too, dangerously naive, and because of our lack of experience we lost much of what could have been gained. Perhaps Wilson compromised too much in Paris and certainly too little in Washington; his concentration on the broader world stage prevented his paying enough attention to the politics of his own backyard.

Yet on the central question of his time, he was everlastingly right. Over and over again he warned us that if we rejected his vision, if we turned down his League of Nations, if we seceded from the emerging world community, we would not only "break the heart of the world," but that we would pay for our failure with our blood.

"There will come, sometime," he warned us, "in the vengeful providence of God, another struggle in which not a few hundred thousand fine men from America will have to die, but as many millions as are necessary to accomplish the final freedom of the peoples of the world."

Yet the pull of isolationism was still strong. In the United States Senate a "little group of willful men" set out to destroy Wilson's vision

and to return us to more familiar paths. Under the two-thirds rule our entry into the new League of Nations was narrowly blocked and America turned her back on her destiny.

Meanwhile, halfway across the world a different kind of drama was unfolding. While Wilson was outlining his plans for a world community based on tolerance and cooperation, Nicholas Lenin was emerging triumphant from the Russian revolution to proclaim his own version of One World, based on bloodshed, the annihilation of "class enemies," and the final "inevitable" victory of Bolshevism.

But after abortive uprisings in Hungary and Germany and the Red Army's defeat before Warsaw, the Soviet Union also withdrew into isolationism, content for a while to foster Communist agitation and united fronts abroad and to create in Russia a more powerful industrial, military and organizational base for the renewal of the global struggle when the conditions were more favorable.

In 1939 came the time that Wilson foresaw, and again the new world went to the rescue and liberation of the old. But there was a profound difference. This time we had lost the vision. This time we boasted that we were no longer naive, idealistic, or young. Now, we thought, we knew the score.

President Franklin Roosevelt, who as a young candidate for the Vice-Presidency had fought to save Wilson's program from destruction, said that this second holocaust within a generation must lead to the creation of a stable world society and increasing areas of opportunity and freedom. But not many took him seriously. When Winston Churchill implied that the Atlantic Charter which they had jointly signed was not intended for Asians and Africans, few Americans even bothered to protest.

### ***THE CENTRAL QUESTION***

So we return to the central question from which I began this discourse: what is America's national purpose today — thirty-five years after Woodrow Wilson's warning that we would pay for our earlier failure in blood? Is our national vision to be limited simply to stopping Russia, so that we may look forward to higher and higher paychecks, to faster and still faster cars, and to more exciting entertainment?

These questions would be uncomfortable in ordinary times. In the face of new Soviet tactics they become supremely ironical. To the eyes of much of the world it is the totalitarian Soviet Union and not democratic American which, at this critical point in history, offers the more persuasive vision.

This vision is a global fraud. But it would be folly to ignore its massive, explosive appeal to unsophisticated, frustrated, impoverished people who are searching for some decisive way to cure the world's ills.

Every night over the Voice of Moscow in a hundred or more different languages millions of people in Asia, Africa and South America hear our totalitarian Communist antagonist speaking the magic words of

social revolution, supporting colonial struggles for independence, backing the dark-skinned majority of the human race against all discrimination by the white minority, offering the use of science and technology for rapid economic development — while we stand mired in our own doubts and divisions, and anchored in situation after situation to the doomed, despised status quo. We have even allowed the Soviet Union to steal from us the title of champion of peace.

We must assume that the true Soviet national purpose remains the same: to achieve, by less risky methods, the goal of world domination that Lenin set in 1917. With new political tactics, new expenditures of energy, capital and technology, and an imaginative new diplomacy Moscow seeks to establish closed political and economic relations with Asia, the Middle East, Africa and eventually South America; to offer persuasive incentives within the Soviet orbit to the industrial productivity of Japan and Germany; to undermine our ties with Western Europe; and country by country, continent by continent, to cut us off politically, economically, ideologically from the people and the resources upon which our power, influence, and well-being are based.

This throws the central problem which faces us into clear perspective; how can we recapture the initiative? How can we regain the respect and influence which we have been losing and find a new common ground with the non-communist two-thirds of mankind?

It is an indication of our present ideological bankruptcy in world affairs that anyone who suggests that *principles* have a legitimate place in American foreign policy will at once be charged with being out of touch with reality. To many diplomats and writers on foreign affairs Wilson was no more than a sloganeer, a master of rhetoric and exhortation, but a failure in the rough, hard game of world politics.

Principles, they will remind us, are well enough in personal dealings. But foreign policy is a serious business. Here our every action must be based on a tough-minded understanding of power.

If we ask for a definition of power, we shall receive a confident answer: power is a composite of military forces, industrial capacity, stores of nuclear weapons and bases from which to deliver them, radar warning systems, dispersion of cities, natural resources, communications, geography, allies.

I wonder if this Maginot Line concept of power which has been so widely accepted as the true realism does not lie at the heart of our present worldwide dilemma? Examine for a moment the dangerous dead ends into which this narrow approach has already taken us since the war. I suggest this review, not because wiser courses of action were obvious at the time, which indeed in several cases they were not, but because in the cold light of experience, they point a valuable lesson.

### IN THE NAME OF "REALISM"

How *realistic* were we to assume that the corrupt government of Chiang Kai-shek, based on feudal landlordism and a bankrupt leadership, could maintain its grip on the revolutionary surge of the Chinese

people — regardless of how much we contributed in the way of military equipment and advisors?

How *realistic* were we to assume that the Communists could be stopped in Indochina — even by one of the ablest of professional armies — as long as the anti-Communist effort remained based on a bankrupt French colonialism tied to an outmoded land system and strangled by corruption?

How *realistic* were we to lead the United Nations forces across the 38th parallel in Korea in the face of a clear warning from Peking — on the assumption the Chinese would not dare to enter the war — only to be forced three years later to settle ignominiously for a truce at approximately that same line but with the additional cost of 125,000 casualties?

How *realistic* were we to upset the delicate balance of power in South Asia by arming the Pakistani, thereby opening the door into Afghanistan for the Russians, further antagonizing the Indians, and enabling Moscow to pose as their defender?

How *realistic* were we to appear to place the friendship of Portugal above that of India on the question of Goa?

How *realistic* indeed have we been to refuse adequate assistance to India on whose great economic and political experiment the future of democracy in Asia and Africa may finally be staked, while the Soviet Union continues to pour capital and technicians into her economic rival, China?

How *realistic* are we to stake, not simply our prestige, but the question of peace or war on two small islands a few miles from the China coast, which are at the mercy of Chinese military power whenever Peking decides to call our bluff?

How *realistic* have we been to focus 97 per cent of our national security budget since the Korean War on military defense, and to concentrate two-thirds of the remainder in economic assistance to three countries — Formosa, South Korea and South Vietnam — with a total population of 44 million, leaving only one per cent for constructive economic assistance to the remaining one billion people of the non-Communist world who will ultimately hold the balance of power, if they don't hold it already?

How *realistic* are we to assume that the Nato alliance with neither political or economic roots will indefinitely stand firm under the new Soviet tactics; that Moscow will agree to a unified Germany on our terms; or that even if Japan's economic dilemma remains unsolved, she will not ultimately revert to neutralism?

I doubt that historians will consider such moves anything but doctrinaire, foolhardy and proof that many American policy-makers were dangerously out of touch with the true nature of power in this revolutionary age.

Our present narrow focus on military answers to the Soviet challenge has not only led us into setback after setback; it has left us disastrously off balance in the face of new economic and political moves from Moscow, and feared and suspected by hundreds of millions of people who should be our friends.

A recent public opinion poll in Calcutta showed that 38% of the Indians interviewed said that *America* was the nation most likely to start World War III while only 2% selected the Soviet Union, 1% Communist China, and the rest didn't know. This seems incredible until we read that another survey showed that 86% of all the newspaper references to the United States in a single month were wire service reports from America of statements and analyses by American officials and members of Congress on *military* matters — our newest atomic submarine, our far-flung air bases, our latest jets, our program of guided missiles. Thus millions of Indians, through our own statements, had come to think of us as a militaristic nation.

If we are to gain a greater measure of security in today's world, we must expand our concept of power to include two essential ingredients which we have largely ignored — dedicated people and dynamic ideas. This has been the prime explosive mixture that overturned the governments of China, Indonesia, India, Indochina, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, the Sudan, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, in a single decade.

In every forced change of government since 1948, with the single exception of Czechoslovakia, the weight of traditional power — military and industrial — has favored the status quo. Yet time after time the status quo has been forced to bow to the revolutionary power of people and ideas, sometimes with bloodshed and brutality, as in China, and in other cases with dignity and compassion, as in India, Pakistan and the Gold Coast.

As long as ideas influence the minds of men, and as long as men and their aspirations are a major component of power, ideas, both good and evil, will continue to upset nations, defy armies and write history. The recognition of this essential dimension of power is, I believe, the New Realism.

### ***A BALANCE: IDEAS AND DEFENSE***

What we must seek, therefore, is a balance between ideas and defense; on the one hand, the bringing together under the banner of a militant new freedom those people of the earth — and today they are by far the majority — who seek the goals that we seek, self-determination, human dignity, expanding opportunities, and peace; and, on the other, the power of a massive, competent defense to provide a screen behind which those goals can vigorously be pursued.

The foreign policy difficulties which we face today stem from our persistent refusal to recognize this dual nature of power. Wilson's vision failed because in disregarding too many political realities he gave the isolationists an opportunity to destroy it. Hay's Open Door Policy in China failed because it represented not America's serious intent, but only a hazy preference for a free China which we had no serious intention of defending.



In the competitive political, economic, military and ideological struggle which is now underway, we possess great advantages. Our economic capacity is still far ahead of the Soviet Union and the resiliency and creativeness of our system of private ownership has been proven beyond all doubt. Our military capacity and skill has also been demonstrated in two world wars in which our forces provided the margin of victory.

The most powerful ideas and principles in history created our American Revolution. FORTUNE Magazine has called it the Permanent Revolution. It is the revolution for equality of opportunity under law, which we began with the Declaration of Independence and solidified through the Constitution.

Our problem now is to bring the principles of that revolution to bear on world problems, to associate ourselves with the aspirations of others, to become a partner in a great world-wide effort to expand freedom and opportunity in their broadest sense. This vision of the human community as our stage, and the common good of all mankind as our test, is what has always been expected of us. This time, however, we must pursue it with hard-headed political wisdom, practicality, and persistence.

When Wilson called us to this new assignment in 1917, it was new, strange, and we were unsure. But now, we have gained experience we then lacked. If we will only look, we will see that our Revolution is alive and marching in the world, in India and Indonesia, in Africa and Asia, in Israel and in Tunisia. If we but rediscover the mission of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln and Wilson, we will find, I believe, that we are again in step with the peoples of the non-Communist world.

We have learned enough about the difficulties — about the passions of nationalism and colonialism, about the great gaps between nations, regions and races, about the intricacies of diplomacy, about the abilities of our antagonists — so that we should have no illusions about the formidable problems that we will face in striving to achieve a politically stable world that offers expanding opportunities and freedom.

A genuine peace is certainly a long way off. The world will not be safe for democracy in our lifetime. But these are still our ends. Let us so declare them. Yet the world will test our dedication to liberal values not by our rhetoric, but by what we *do* on the day-to-day questions that are shaping their lives. This time we must mean what we declare and fashion policies which realistically reflect our stated purposes.

What kind of policies are in order? On this subject, I have written and spoken extensively for the last several years. The subject is vast and extends far beyond our time limitations this evening. But some general comments may be in order.

Our foreign policy, as I see it, should be a synthesis of three different, but related fields of activity — military defense, economic cooperation and development, and diplomacy. Let us examine each of these in order — while keeping in mind the *national purpose* which our foreign policy is designed to achieve.



### **CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF DEFENSE**

Military defense is the first basic, essential component in a balanced foreign policy program. Without the screen provided by really adequate military power we will be denied even the opportunity to promote our national purposes, and eventually reduced to the status of a second class power.

An adequate military defense includes the maintenance at all times of sufficient striking power to deter the Soviet Union from armed aggression without ourselves emerging as a military threat to others. A detailed discussion of this subject involves the question of an all-out nuclear attack and defense against local aggression. There is not time tonight for such a comprehensive analysis.

National defense will remain a costly proposition. Since the end of the Korean war military expenditures have taken 10% of our gross national income. Yet the relative economic strain on the Soviet Union has been considerably greater. So as long as this massive investment in security is necessary we should not begrudge the price.

What concerns many of us is the possibility that we may have been paying for a defense which we do not have. Repeated assertions from high military leaders that the Soviet is forging ahead in many categories of offense and defense in spite of our vast expenditures, are profoundly disturbing. We may hope that the Congressional investigation of the present state of our defense will probe the depths of this question and offer us guidance on what is required.

The time has also come for a reappraisal of our system of military alliances to determine which are reliable and which are less so. The value of a close military association with nations such as Britain, whose stake in the preservation and expansion of the rights of man are similar to our own, and which shares a common experience with totalitarian aggression, is clear beyond all question. Such alliances are basic to our security in both the narrowest and broadest sense of the term.

Yet we must recognize the possibility that military alliances with nations which share neither our political and ideological concepts nor even our interpretation of the present danger may crumble under pressure. Such nations may ally themselves with us primarily to secure special political or economic advantages which for one reason or another we are not prepared to give.

When this occurs intense disillusionment may set in from both sides. Neither feels that it is getting what it has presumably paid for. Instead of gaining additional security, we may end up with less.

We should also re-examine the impact of our alliances on localized power balances. For instance, when we entered into an agreement to strengthen Pakistan's military establishment we upset the existing balance of power in much of South Asia. Thus, instead of contributing to the security of our true interests in this critical area, this association in its present form seems to have had the reverse effect.

On the one hand, the Soviet Union used our agreement with Pakistan to open the door into Afghanistan where they are now making rapid

political and economic progress. At the same time, India has been further turned against us and today faces three unwelcome choices, the implications of which we have appeared largely to ignore.

India, can, of course, assume that regardless of present tensions a more powerfully armed Pakistan does not in fact threaten her security. This is the view we have been urging her government to take. Yet India is no more likely to accept an unbalanced level of forces in an area which she considers vital to her interests than we are to disregard a similar shift of the present military balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

A second possibility open to India is the diversion of part of her inadequate national income from her present crucially important economic development efforts to military purposes in order to match the increase in Pakistan's military power which we are now financing. This would cause her to fall further behind in her crucial economic competition with Communist China and increase her internal political instability.

A third possibility, if the present tensions increase, may be the temptation to purchase arms at low prices from the Soviet Union with Moscow's bland assurance that there are no "political strings."

The suggestion that India could escape from this dilemma by joining our anti-Communist alliance and getting her military equipment free will be dismissed as a clumsy effort to pressure her government into a fundamental shift in her foreign policy which, rightly or wrongly, it is determined not to make.

In South Asia our interests would appear to have been best served by maintaining open friendly access to Afghanistan and doing what we can to ease the tensions between Pakistan and India. Our policies have instead had the very opposite effect. Afghanistan has felt forced to turn increasingly to our adversary for help and unless a new balance of power can soon be erected which is satisfactory to all concerned, India seems ultimately destined to make a cruel choice between costly alternatives. This is the result of our ill-advised focus on the narrowest of military objectives that in this instance as in others has led to less security and increasing animosity for all concerned.

It also seems essential that we re-examine our military alliances in the light of economic and political realities. The power and cohesiveness of Nato may steadily deteriorate in the face of the new Soviet tactics, unless Western Europe is soon given a more solid economic and political cohesiveness.

This objective was written into the North Atlantic Alliance Charter. Yet we have consistently failed to take the imaginative leadership that this situation requires. Germany's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and East Germany, in the years after Mr. Adenauer leaves the scene, may turn to our disadvantage if we do not switch the character and perspective of Nato while we still have time and room for maneuver.

This also holds true in a different sense for our alliance with Japan, a nation which faces the most formidable economic difficulties. If this situation is allowed to drift, it is only a matter of time before Japan will be drawn closer to the Moscow-Peking bloc by the harsh economic realities of her position.

We cannot leave the question of military defense without a few brief comments on the problems involved in disarmament. Many American leaders assume that the Soviet Union has no serious reasons to accept an equitable disarmament program. I believe that there are increasing indications that the opposite may be the case.

Once the leaders of the Soviet Union have established their ability to match or surpass us in the scientific development of new weapons, and once they have become convinced that the nuclear stalemate is a reality, they have much to gain from extensive slashes in that part of their productive output which is earmarked for the military.

Whatever sums might be saved could promptly be put to work to further Moscow's objectives in any of several areas. Living standards could be raised within the Soviet Union which would offer to millions throughout the world a persuasive new demonstration of Communist industrial capacity, and there is the inviting prospect of political and economic gains to be made through expanded development programs in Asia, Africa, and even South America.

Many American leaders will look on disarmament, if the Soviet Union should at some later stage agree to a sound, trick-proof program, with misgivings. Some disruption of our economy would almost certainly follow.

But seriously to oppose an otherwise acceptable disarmament program on these grounds is unthinkable. The strength and adaptability of our economy has been proven. Our country desperately needs intensive development of its educational system, expanded city redevelopment and slum clearance, new highways and new hospitals, not to speak of our own opportunities for constructive investment overseas.

If it so happens that responsible disarmament proposals for whatever reason are at some point forthcoming from the Soviet Union, let us welcome them with confidence and goodwill. To behave in any other way will be to convince much of the world that the musty Marxist charge that our capitalist system can prosper only through war or the threat of war is in fact correct. This charge is nonsensical and we should welcome the opportunity to prove it so.

### ***THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD ECONOMICS***

The second area of action in foreign affairs is the creation of a balanced, interrelated and fully adequate policy in regard to world economic development. Here again it is essential that we relate our program closely to our national purpose.

For two reasons the development of viable, politically stable nations in Asia and Africa and South America is essential to the achievement of our national purpose.

First, there is the fast growing dependence of America and even more, the nations of Western Europe, upon the underdeveloped continents for raw materials, which I have previously mentioned. The new nations of Asia are already masters in their own houses, and the pres-

asures for self-determination in Africa will sooner or later prove irresistible. We can no longer expect to procure raw materials from these potentially rich continents, or from South America either, on more or less our own terms.

Whether these new nations continue to make them available to us will depend in increasing measure not simply on our ability to offer good prices, but on the considered decisions of their governments as to the political desirability of selling them to us, leaving them temporarily underground, or disposing of them to the Communist bloc.

Second, as living standards go up, potential markets for American products abroad will increase rapidly. Switzerland with its five million people today buys more from the United States than India with 360 million. If living standards in non-Communist Asia, Africa and South America could be doubled, and if we maintain an open, healthy flow of trade, the stimulating effect on industry in every American city and town would be incalculable.

Thus within the next ten to fifteen years our economic growth and security will be increasingly related to the political stability and the political attitudes of the underdeveloped continents which we have so often ignored. To a substantial degree our future will depend not only on our ability to win the respect of government leaders throughout Asia, Africa and South America, but on the extent to which libertarian concepts are strengthened and societies created which offer the individual increasing opportunities for economic advancement, an expanding measure of dignity, and a corresponding stake in political stability. This can only come about as his country forges forward, as living standards rise, and to the degree that he feels he is participating in that development and has a just share in its growth.

This latter point is of the utmost importance. If economic development is provided *for* a community or nation, either by its own government or by a foreign government, without the *participation* of the people themselves, most of the political value of development will be lost and demands for faster progress will become more and more detached from the realities of what actually can be achieved.

Indeed, my own experience leads me to believe that within reasonable limits the *manner* of economic growth is even more important than the *extent* of that growth. Our failure to take this human factor in economic development into account has been a principal weakness of many of our foreign aid programs.

### **LONG-RANGE AID PROGRAM NEEDED**

Thus, an adequate, long-range program of assistance intelligently keyed to the political and ideological as well as the economic realities of the underdeveloped continents, is essential to our national objectives. Such a program should be based primarily on long-term loans with the highest quality technical assistance where it is required.

We have learned a great deal about the right and wrong ways to administer such a program during the last few years. If we keep our eye closely focused on the purpose of these programs, what they will accomplish and what they will not accomplish, past mistakes can largely be eliminated.

Foreign aid, no matter how massive, will not buy for us the loyalty of any nation or people. It is also folly to assume that simply by filling people's stomachs we can automatically turn them into believers in liberal democracy — American brand. If we gauge the extent of our assistance solely by the number of Communists in each country, the recipients may be pardoned if they ask, "If we had twice as many Communists, would we get twice as much?" If we give simply to match the Russians, they may someday say, "There is the dam the Russians frightened the Americans into building for us." Nor will economic assistance enable us for long to prop up inept or corrupt governments which are out of touch with their people's needs and aspirations.

The primary, all-important objective of our economic assistance program should be to help new and struggling nations to create societies which offer the steadily expanding measure of justice and opportunity which I have previously described as essential to political stability. If it is to contribute effectively to this objective, economic aid should be given in ways that will help strengthen those leaders who are able to rally public support. There will be times when such standards must be compromised on a short term basis — but these should be as few as possible.

For years now many of our associates in the United Nations have voted for a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development — SUNFED, they call it; yet we have rejected proposals for even a small experimental budget. Such a project vigorously supported by the United States may now provide a particularly effective answer to the new Russian economic and political effort. The Russians have no reason to strengthen the United Nations; they have no desire to see a democratic world organization gain influence and substance. They would prefer their aid offers to be bilateral, to remain the narrow political instrument of Soviet policy.

We could take the ground out from under them now if we announced our readiness to support this United Nations venture, to channel more of our aid through the United Nations and thus to remove it bodily from the field of the Cold War. We should do this not negatively simply to undercut Russia, but positively because we have a creative purpose of our own which leads us to do it.

But whether our loans and grants are made bilaterally, through the United Nations, or the Colombo Plan, or a combination of all three, a substantial increase in assistance to the underdeveloped countries is urgently required. Yet measured against our total national security budget and our productivity, the amounts needed are not formidable.

A year from today if we maintain our present rate of growth, we will be producing \$12 billion more goods and services than we are producing at present. We can undertake highly adequate foreign aid pro-

grams by setting aside no more than 15 percent of our annual *increase* in national income.

In developing positive plans for the creation of durable bonds of economic self-interest with the non-Communist world, we start with some enormous advantages. The Soviet Union under a totalitarian government can operate, of course, with somewhat greater flexibility. Her rate of economic growth is more rapid than ours, and she is turning out more trained technicians and scientists.

Yet for many years to come our economic capacity will be far ahead of Russia's. Not the least of our assets is our huge farm productivity. I believe the day may soon come when we will stop looking at our store of 1.4 billion bushels of grain and 10 million bales of cotton as a white elephant in a world where most of the people are ill-fed and ill-clothed, and recognize it as an opportunity and a blessing.

The habits of thinking which now limit our capacity for action on such questions are deeply rooted in most of us. Yet these man-made economic roadblocks are by no means as formidable as those which kept us immobilized in the depths of the Great Depression. As millions of hungry, unemployed people walked past grocery stores overflowing with unsold food products, worried government leaders and respected economists could only say: "We know it is wrong. But what can we do about it? These people have no purchasing power." In the Fall of 1932 American leaders in both political parties asserted that recovery from the depression could best be accomplished by a balanced budget and a reduction in the power and activities of our federal government.

Yet by the Summer of 1933 a substantial majority of the American people had thrown its support behind programs for economic expansion and reform which broke abruptly with the outmoded economic folklore that had so recently held us back. Millions went back to work; farm income rose; factories began to hum, and old facilities were expanded. Everyone benefited as the flow of capital and purchasing power raised living standards and set new horizons of mutual opportunity and growth.

Now, as in those days, we must muster our imagination and initiative to chart new ground. We must find ways to fit productivity to needs in international economics as we have already done so successfully within our own borders. And as we discover the economic mechanisms necessary to accomplish this objective, vast new opportunities will open up here in America and throughout the world.

### **DIPLOMACY BROADLY VIEWED**

The third of the three areas of action in which our foreign policy must be made more effective may be discussed under the general heading of diplomacy. In this case I shall use the word diplomacy in its broadest sense to include not only our day-to-day negotiations with other governments, but our approach to other *peoples*.

This phase of our work abroad will determine in large measure what others believe to be the advantages and disadvantages of a close

economic and political relationship with our country. Thus our policies must never lose sight of our national purpose which is to promote political stability securely rooted in increasingly libertarian concepts of expanding opportunities, growth and justice.

The manner in which we present our defense and economic development programs will do much to shape foreign attitudes towards America. A more positive image can be created only if we break loose from the hypnotic grip of the Kremlin, stop keying our every move to what Khrushchev and Bulganin have just done or said, and begin to act positively and creatively on our own initiative.

If our public emphasis remains largely military in the face of the Soviet New Look, we may assume that hundreds of millions of people will continue to look on us as primarily a military-minded nation; the one most likely to start a third World war. If, on the other hand, we are able to convince a majority in Europe, Asia, Africa and South America by our statements and actions that the sole objective of our military defense is to help secure a peaceful world for the benefit of mankind, and that we are prepared at all times to discuss honest proposals for disarmament, we will have taken a long step towards restoring our seriously diminished influence abroad.

In economic development we have a similar opportunity convincingly to demonstrate our desire to work with others as a constructive partner and friend on the base of mutual self-interest. Here again much will depend on how we provide our assistance and the motivation behind it. Aid given negatively in an abortive effort to buy friends, to put other nations in our debt, or solely because the Communists are in one country and not in another, or to match what Russia does, will be far less effective than aid given on a more positive basis.

Our day-to-day relations with other nations will continue to be shaped by the efforts of our foreign service and by such agencies as our expanded foreign aid offices, United States Information Service which touch other people and governments. The employees of these agencies, by and large, are as able as any similar group in the world. What is sorely needed is a clearer sense of mission, improved policy and program direction and the knowledge that they have the vigorous support not only of Congress, but of the Administration. In recent years, this sense of support often has been lacking.

An increased flow of highly competent people into our foreign service will certainly occur as our policies reflect a new sense of enlightenment and purpose; not only young people embarked on life-long careers, but men and women ready and willing for special assignment from our universities, business and the labor movement. The day-to-day attitudes and approach of these Americans in every foreign capital and in most of the major cities of the world, will be an important element in creating new bonds of good will and mutual self-interest with people overseas.

In dealing with the Communist nations we should distinguish between their legitimate interests and concerns, which need not necessarily conflict with our own, and their stated, self-evident goals which lie at the heart of the present conflict. It would be folly to assume that these



goals are now in process of fundamental change. Yet we should never abandon the hope that with the growth of political stability throughout the non-Communist world and our own increasing association with that growth, leaders of the Soviet Union may gradually come to accept a more or less permanent pattern of world society in which old rivalries may first be submerged and eventually abandoned.

Such an adjustment will not come easily or soon, or indeed will it even enter the realm of possibility, unless we are able to associate our own interests so convincingly with those of the non-Communist bulk of mankind that further Soviet expansion by whatever means becomes impossible. Enduring relations with nations of the non-Communist world directly allied with us or neutral, can only be developed effectively on the common ground of mutual self-interest, and by recognizing our real interests and purposes, and those of each nation with which we are dealing.

Many of our present difficulties stem from our failure to understand how the world appears to others. We have been quick to assume, and then to act on the assumption that those who do not share more or less precisely our perspective on the world conflict are unfriendly, unsophisticated or tainted with Communism.

Palmerston once said, "Britain has no permanent friends; only permanent interests." Others have pointed out that any rich and powerful nation cannot expect to win friends, but only to achieve respect. There is a large measure of wisdom in such views, provided we learn to define our interests and our purposes within the framework of our interrelated, revolutionary, present day world.

Because of our failure to visualize our interdependence with other continents, because of our stubborn lingering isolationism, our domestic political confusion, and our lack of bold and imaginative leadership, we have allowed the similarity between our traditional national purposes and those of much of the non-Communist world to become obscured.

A year ago at Bandung the representatives of 28 Asian and African nations outlined their four primary objectives: freedom from colonial domination, dignity of the individual regardless of his race, creed or color, expanding economic opportunities, and peace. These concepts are not Marxist; they are *Western* and *American*. Indeed they are no more or no less than a reflection into these vast continents of the continuing American Revolution for which Jefferson, Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt spoke so eloquently.

### **WORDS NO LONGER SUFFICIENT**

But expressions of reverence for our forefathers on suitable national holidays will no longer convince others of the sincerity of our generation of Americans. They will judge us in the years ahead not by our rhetoric of the Rights of Man, but by what we do or fail to do to advance those rights.



For instance, our influence in Asia and Africa will continue steadily to diminish unless we come to grips with the question of colonialism. At present we stand on dead center, harried on the one hand by the pressure of our Nato associates; and on the other by the articulate, persistent strength of nationalism not only in Asia, but in Africa. While the Voice of America presents us as the leader of a global coalition for freedom, most of the non-Communist peoples watch in dismay and confusion as we attempt to squirm our way through what they recognize as one of the great democratic issues of our time.

To give priority to the securing of applause from the Asian and African groups in the United Nations by demagogic attacks on colonialism would be reckless and destructive. Yet colonialism is a dying institution. We should welcome and not deplore this fact, and set as a primary task of our diplomacy its liquidation in an orderly way with the minimum harm and embarrassment to our friends and with the maximum opportunity to those millions of people who ultimately must shape their own futures.

Our influence might be brought to bear by proposing a United Nations charter for Africa. Such a charter would recognize the rights of both Africans and Europeans, and advocate the goal of self-determination as rapidly as it can be achieved in the context of political stability and economic growth on a flexible, timetable basis.

In every situation of this kind a wise diplomacy will recognize that in today's world quick, absolute solutions are almost never practical or attainable. Yet a central fact of our time is the determination of the dispossessed half of mankind to end its poverty and backwardness, to throw off the bonds which have tied it to the past. Our capacity confidently to welcome this new surge and the opportunities which it offers those who believe in the libertarian principles of growth and development, will go far to determine our own role in world affairs.

The Voice of America offers us an opportunity for the bold presentation of our views. Instead of harping almost solely on the sins and iniquities of our Soviet adversaries we should give priority to the *purposes* which we as a people and a nation hold in common with the bulk of mankind. Convincing testimony to the health of these commonly shared objectives can be provided by emphasizing the day-to-day accomplishments of economic and political liberalism, not simply in our own country but through the non-Communist world.

Yet we cannot purchase good will, much less security for ourselves by creating new broadcasting stations or concocting new slogans. Unless the words of the Voice of America are solidly rooted in *recognizable American* action, they will remain thin and unconvincing.

Those experienced in public relations and salesmanship know the basic principle of persuasion: products which people do not want are hard to sell; people who are not emotionally prepared to believe are difficult to convince; few can be induced to buy a product twice which in *their* minds is not what its manufacturers say it is, or which on trial has failed to live up to his promises.

### *RISING WITH THE OCCASION*

What has been proposed here represents a new emphasis in our present approach to world affairs and what, I believe to be a more realistic means of coping with the problems of American security, development and growth.

If we have a purpose on this earth — and I profoundly believe that we have — it is to assure the preservation and the ultimate expansion throughout the world of the spirit of liberal democracy with its primary regard for the dignity and integrity of man. Our ability to give this concept new meaning and direction in today's stormy world depends in large measure on the degree to which we believe in it and practice it ourselves.

If we succeed in recapturing this traditional American vision, we will, I believe, have regained our national sense of purpose. And as we act under this new purpose, we will lose our frustration, because we and most of the world will again be in tune. Within this new harmony we can move surely and confidently towards the only true security in which man can put his trust.

Such an approach will require of both political parties a leadership which recognizes the futility of policies still rooted in isolationist dreams of a self-sufficient American island of peace and plenty buttressed securely against all challengers behind a wall of oceans, air bases and acquiescent allies.

Yet most political leaders remain hesitant and unsure. Even those who accept what we may call the New Realism in world affairs are fearful that they will lose public support if they strike out boldly in the directions which I have suggested. I wonder if they do not seriously underestimate the American people?

Everywhere throughout my travels across the United States — east, west, north and south — I have found Americans seeking earnestly for a clearer sense of purpose. Where their present view of America's world role is narrow, it is because our policy-makers have thus far failed to offer the broader vision which great leaders have provided in earlier critical periods of our history.

I deeply believe that the political party which offers the American people this vision will capture not only their imagination but their votes in November 1956.

Essex, Connecticut, April 16, 1956.

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Hon. Chester Bowles  
Essex, Connecticut

Dear Chester:

Many thanks for your letter of October 10 informing me that Harpers was sending me a copy of your new book, THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF PEACE.

I have received the book and look forward to reading it with the greatest pleasure. Please let me know when you next come to Washington so that we can have a chance to discuss your book and other developments in a fast moving world.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

*Ham*

Mr. Chester Bowles

Essex, Connecticut

Dear Chester:

CONFIDENTIAL

Many thanks for your letter of October 10 informing me that Harpers was sending me a copy of your new book, THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF PEACE.

I have just now received the book ~~but have only had an opportunity to give it a cursory glance at this time.~~ I am very anxious to give your latest work the thorough reading I am sure it deserves and I shall do so at my earliest opportunity.

Sincerely,

I have received the book and look

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Allen W. Dulles  
Director

forward to reading it with the greatest pleasure. Please let me know when you next come to Washington so that we can have a chance to discuss your book and other development in a fast moving world.

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CHESTER BOWLES  
ESSEX, CONNECTICUT

October 10, 1955

Dear Allen:

I have asked Harpers to send you a book which I completed this summer - THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF PEACE. You should get it soon.

Although I started this book three years ago, the issues which I present, however inadequately, may be even more valid today as we face a new and potentially far more formidable Soviet strategy. I do hope you will have a chance to read it.

With my warmest regards.

Sincerely,



Chester Bowles

Mr. Allen Dulles  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

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